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Abstract
This paper tests the impact of competition on the hiring process in the
French retail sector. Following the Becker’s theory, higher the competi-
tion, lower is discrimination. Using local Herfindhal-Hirschman indexes, a
correspondence study ensures to observe how competition affects discrim-
ination. A strong employment gap is observable between French natives
and second generation immigrants. Concerning gender, women are fa-
vored as cashiers. The impact of competition depends on the target pop-
ulation: competition reinforces preference for women, whereas discrimi-
nation due to origin is follows the Becker’s theory. However, increasing
competition to fight against discrimination is not a solution, as it will
enhance bad condition of women in the labor market and an increase of
awareness of human resources department to equality of treatment is more
efficient.
Résumé
Une large littérature s’accorde sur un effet de la concurrence sur le marché
des biens sur la discrimination. Mais l’ensemble de ces études se focalisent
sur les salaires et les postes, sans s’intéresser à l’embauche. Cet arti-
cle teste l’impact de la concurrence sur le processus d’embauche et ses
conséquences sur les écarts d’emploi. Deux types de discrimination sont
étudiés : le genre et l’origine. Le secteur choisi est celui de la grande
distribution. En utilisant des niveaux locaux de concurrence, un testing
permet d’observer comment la concurrence affecte la discrimination. Les
résultats montrent que la concurrence peut accentuer la discrimination
statistique dans le cas du genre. De plus, elle n’est pas forcément un bon
outil pour lutter contre la discrimination, le cas de l’origine montrant un
impact plus fort de la centralisation du recrutement et de la sensibilisation
des recruteurs.
JEL Codes: J71, C93
Keywords: Discrimination, hiring, competition
Mots clés: Discrimination, embauche, concurrence
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1 Introduction
The presence of discrimination on the labor market is now well documented
(Altonji & Blank (1999)). Studies on wage differentials, glass ceilings and em-
ployment access in many countries point out a persistent discrimination against
women and ethnic minorities. Discrimination against sexual minorities or dis-
ables is yet observed in spite of a lack of data. More attention is now paid
to the mechanims and how to disentangle different types of discrimination to
lead fitted policies. In order to test the Becker’s theory, researchers analyze
the impact of competition on discrimination and results tend to confirm the
theory. However, these studies focus on labor outcomes on the job. This article
aims at filling out the literature by testing the impact of competition on hiring
discrimination.
Discrimination is introduced in economics by Becker (1957). He defines dis-
crimination as the result of a taste. Some employers, coworkers or consumers
do not want to employ, work with or buy something to an individual belonging
to a particular group. It induces a different treatment of these workers from
the others, in spite of identical observable productive characteristics. However,
in the case of employers, satisfying their taste for discrimination is costly, as it
reduces the pool of applicants for the firm, and workers belonging to the group
discriminated against receive a lower wage because of the psychological cost of
their employer. In a competitive market, prejudiced firms are less efficient than
the others and will be drive out of the market. Arguments are relatively similar
in the case of prejudiced co-workers and rational employers hire only one type
of workers in order to obtain the largest productivity of workers. The steady
state is a perfect segregation, which is not realistic. The case of prejudiced
consumers is the only stable case. Indeed, employers increase their profit when
they answer to the taste of customers for discrimination. However, it concerns
only jobs, which implicate a direct contact with customers. In order to ex-
plain a persistence of discrimination, Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) enhance
this theory by developing the concept of statistical discrimination. In this case,
discrimination does not result from a particular taste but from imperfect infor-
mation and beliefs of employers. These formers are assumed to know the true
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productivity level of workers belonging to her group and ignore the productiv-
ity of workers belonging to another group. To set the wage of workers of the
minority, they also use the expectancy of the average estimated productivity of
this group. Generally, individuals of the majority believe that workers of the
minority are less productive in average and the wage offered to them is lower
than the wage offered to workers of the majority. However, a phenomenon of
learning makes it disappear. In both theories, discrimination does not have to
persist. This explains that a lot of empirical studies aim at outstanding the role
of competition in the phenomenon of discrimination in the labor market.
Empirically, most of studies focus on discrimination on the job. They first
compare wage gap and employment rate in differently concentrated sectors (Co-
manor (1973), Hellerstein et al. (2002)). However the comparison of distinct
sectors induces biases due to their unobservable characteristics. To avoid them,
Peoples & Saunders (1993), Heywood & Peoples (1994) and Black & Strahan
(2001) used external shocks of competition within a sector in order to observe
its consequences on wage gap, employment rate and occupations. Ashenfelter &
Hannan (1986) slightly differed in their method as they determine the impact of
competition on labor market output thanks to the diversity of local competition
in the US banking sector. A third way to study the impact of competition is
to observe variations due to globalization of trade. Black & Brainerd (2004)
show that competition decreases wage differentials between men and women,
improves job attainment and the rate of workers discriminated against in the
sector. However, no study focuses explicitly on the hiring process, because of the
lack of data concerning employment. This is an important issue, particularly, in
a period of large unemployment, where discrimination will be revealed more in
the hiring process than in wages. This article offers to complete the literature
by leading a field experiment in areas with different level of competition. Corre-
spondence studies underline discrimination in the hiring process against women
ethnic minorities across a large set of countries and ethnicities. Existence of
discrimination against this population allows me to focus on the topic of this
article: the impact of competition on the discrimination due to origin and gen-
der. In order to easily measure the level of competition, the tested sector is the
French retail sector. Indeed, databases on strategic data are available and the
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local competition varies sharply across regions. A correspondence study gives
the data on discrimination and a matching with competition databases allow
me to study how competition affects discrimination during the hiring process.
Main results are that women are favored and discrimination is observable
against second generation immigrants. The impact of competition on employ-
ment varies according to the type of discrimination: A less competitive environ-
ment leads to a higher equity between men and women, showing the particular
condition of women in this job, whereas the impact of competition is more stan-
dard concerning origin. Discrimination against men seems to be a statistical
discrimination as when competition is sharper, employers favor women. This
mirrors the study of Askenazy et al. (2009) on the French retail sector, where
women are said more susceptible to work in bad condition. The type of discrim-
ination against second generation immigrants is not straightforward. A part is
clearly due to a taste of employers. However, the other part could be due to
customers’ taste or to statistical discrimination.
This paper is organized as follows. The design of the experimentation is
presented in Section 2. The Section 3 gives the empirical results and robustness
checks are described in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
A correspondence study is a field experiment aiming at measuring discrimi-
nation in the hiring process among a particular characteristic such as gender,
ethnicity, nationality and so on. Two similar resumes are spontaneously sent to
a large number of firms or in order to answer to an ad. The only significant
difference between both resumes is the characteristic researcher wants to test.
This experiment can be extended by an audit but it induces biases because of
unobservable characteristics of fictious applicants. Moreover I consider that an
interview is costly for the firm and the selection due to discriminatory criteria
is often done during the resume step. In order to find a more precise argumen-
tation, see Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004). Thereafter, an econometric study
of the likelihood of callback of each candidate measures discrimination.
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Riach & Rich (2002) surveyed audit and correspondence studies and listed
them by country and methodology. The first correspondence study was done
by Jowell & Prescott-Clarke (1970) in Great Britain. This experiment con-
cerned discrimination against non-white looking for white-collar jobs. They
aimed at distinguishing between discrimination due to ’color’ and discrimina-
tion due to ’foreignness’ by using different origins, and they found evidence on
a greater disadvantage for the colored immigrant group than for the white im-
migrant group. Other field experiments followed in a large set of countries like
Australia, the United-States, Canada, the United-Kingdom and France. Inter-
national economic reviews began to publish correspondence studies in the 1980s
and this procedure is now well-known as an objective measure of discrimination
in the hiring process by researchers in economics. The correspondence study of
Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) on racial discrimination in Boston and Chicago
is now the reference of field experiment on discrimination. They tested the im-
pact of a sounding African-American name in the labor market. They found
a significant discrimination against African-American workers, which seems to
be due to some tastes of employers because a better quality of resume does not
improve the number of callbacks of this minority.
During the 1990s and 2000s decades, these experiments gain an official recog-
nition. The International Labor Office (LBO) commissioned audit and corre-
sponding studies in European countries to deeply observe the phenomenon of
discrimination on the labor market in Europe. Studies were executed in the Ned-
erland, Germany, Spain, Belgium and, later, Italy, Sweden and France. This
commission legitimated this kind of experimentation to measure discrimination
on the labor market in the political sphere. Some countries, like France in 2004,
legalized this practice in order to fight against discrimination.
As regards the aim of this article, a correspondence study is well-adapted to
measure discrimination in the hiring process. Local variations of competition
in the selected sector allow observing their impact on discrimination. The ex-
perimental design is described in five paragraphs. The first one explains how
the retail sector has been selected. The second paragraph concerns geographical
areas where the correspondence study takes place. The third part points out
jobs and type of applicants targeted by the experiment. The fifth section deals
6
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with the creation of the fictious resumes. The last one describes the timeline.
Sector selection The retail sector is highly regulated in France. The official
aim of these policies is to protect traditional groceries from a sharp competition
of supermarkets and megastores. A first law is voted in 1973 and made com-
pulsory for new entrant to apply for an authorization to build a new store (or
just to enlarge an existing one) if the surface area is larger than 1000m2 in a
small city or than 1500m2 in a large city. The regional board charged to study
the application is composed of local elected members, store owners already es-
tablished and representatives of consumers. This regional zoning board created
a barrier to enter the market and only few new stores have been authorized to
set up. Bertrand & Kramarz (2002) studied the impact of the Royer law and
found that stronger deterrence of entry by local boards increased retailer con-
centration. Besides, the concentration ratio in the retail sector has a negative
impact on employment, in the retail sector and in the economy. On the contrary,
the number of approvals by the regional zoning board has a positive effect. It
suggests that the zoning regulation introduced in France in the early 1970s to
restrain the development of large stores has an impact on the whole economy.
Moreover, this law explains a part of geographical discrepencies in competi-
tion as some boards were more favorable than others. Askenazy et al. (2009)
point out this heterogeneity throughout the country as stores are unequally dis-
tributed. Some stores are in a monopolistic situation, often in rural areas, and
others are surrounded by stores belonging to other groups and competition is
sharper.
In 1996, two other laws restricted the competition: The Galland and Raffarin
laws, both applied in 1997. The Galland law consists in forbidding stores to
pass on individually negotiated discounts to consumers. This is equivalent to
allowing industry-wide price floors. Biscourp et al. (2008) and Allain et al.
(2008) show that it induced an increase in prices and a decrease in the level
of competition of the retail sector. The Raffarin law reinforced the Royer law
of 1973 by generalizing the necessity of approval to enlarge or establish a large
store. The new threshold dramatically decreased to 300m2. Both Galland and
Raffarin acts strengthened the regulation of the market.
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Recent laws relaxed both acts (Dutreil in 2003 and Chatel in 2008 for the
Galland law and LME in 2008 for the Raffarin law). In spite of these amend-
ments, aiming at increasing competition, the French retail sector remains highly
concentrated. In a report of 2009, the French Competition Authority (Autorité
de la concurrence) notes that the French retail sector is very concentrated, re-
ally similar to an oligopoly. Indeed, this sector is essentially composed of six
main companies, which represent 85% of the sector in terms of market share
in 2009. Companies are organizes in two different ways: One half is coopera-
tive and the other half is integrated. This distinction will be useful in order to
identify discrimination due to employer taste. Indeed, on the one hand, man-
agers are owners of their store and are only member of the brand. On the other
hand, managers are wage-earning and receive a profit-share as branch store or
franchise. In the second case, the employer taste for discrimination would be
more difficult to express. Another useful remark concerns the way of recruit-
ment. One of these six companies centralizes its hiring process. Stores, which
serache applicants for a job or receive resumes, have to contact the centralized
human resources department. Then, two or three applicants are proposed to
each vacant post. This policy aims at reducing costs and discrimination. The
company increases workers of the human resources department awareness of
diversity and equity during the hiring process. However, results show that all
stores of this company do not use this procedure and recruit themselves. They
probably want to choose applicants corresponding to their taste. A dummy,
called central recruitment, captures this effect in probit estimations.
Areas selection and competition The second step of this experiment is
to locate favorable places to do the test and to measure competition. The
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is an adequate measure of competition in
our context. Indeed, the index has a large scale and disentangle uncompetitive
areas even if there are only few stores in the area. HHI is the sum of the squares
of the market shares of each chain of retail. The data base I use contains an
exhaustive list of the retail stores in March 2011, with precise information on
location, phone number, surface area and number of cash desks. Consequently,
it is possible to precisely calculate HHI at a local level.
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Figure 1: Herfinhal-Hirschmann Index by employment area
Areas are selected in two steps. First, I focus on local labor markets with
similar demographic characteristics. The employment areas or zones d’emploi
fit this definition as this geographic scale is determined by the French National
Institute of Statistics (INSEE) as a territory, where most of people, who live in-
side, work inside. HHI is calculated in each employment area, considering that
the local labor market roughly fit the customer catchment areas (Figure 1).
Thereafter, measures will be more precise, using a smaller geographical scale.
Employment areas are break down in three categories: competitive, uncompet-
itive and highly uncompetitive. The index goes from less than 1000 to more
than 6000. An industry is usually considered as competitive when the HHI is
less than 1000, uncompetitive between 1000 and 2000 and highly uncompeti-
tive for more than 2000. The local retail sectors are highly uncompetitive and
the bounds used in the article are slightly different. Each category contains one
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third of the total of employment areas without Corsica, which is very particular.
An area is considered as competitive under 2404, uncompetitive between 2404
and 3045 and highly uncompetitive above. Figure 4 shows that the density of
HHI of the selected zones is similar to the whole employment areas.
A merge with data from INSEE of 2007, on characteristics of employment
areas and competition data enables to summarize their characteristics. The
selected areas try to be representative of each category but could be various
in term of demographic characteristics like the concentration of immigrants
(Figure 3) or population density. A special attention is paid to equilibrate
these characteristics in each competition category. Table 1 summarizes the
characteristics of the selected employment areas.
Table 1: Average characteristics of selected employment areas
Competitive Uncompetitive Highly
uncompetitive
# observations 12 21 21
Population 384,465 248,367 127,583
(331,571) (257,579) (86,993)
Density 0.28 0.28 0.28
(inhab./km2) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Immigration rate 0.07 0.06 0.08
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Unemployment rate 11.3 10.8 9.15
(2.11) (2.20) (2.99)
Surface area 103,490 63,124 36,164
(km2) (84,734) (52,143) (23,555)
HHI 2,148 2,705 3,987
(156.98) (205.2) (1061.1)
For each category, the first line is the mean and in brackets are the standard
deviation coefficients.
Employment areas are too large to approximately fit customer catchment
areas of stores. A second zoning is necessary to better approximate the local
level of competition. Population catchment areas (PCA), "bassin de vie" in
the INSEE nomenclature, are the smallest areas, where inhabitants can access
to current facilities and employment. The aggregate measure of facilities con-
tains an index on competitive facilities (retail, stores, bank...), non-competitive
10
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Figure 2: Herfinhal-Hirschmann Index by life pool
facilities (post office, gendarmerie, notary public, swimming pool, cinemas...),
health facilities (doctors, pharmacy, dentist, maternity hospital, casualty de-
partment, hospital...) and education institutions (primary school, high school).
The French territory is break down in more than 2,000 PCA, urban and rural.
By construction, PCA are relatively similar to customer catchment areas of re-
tail stores, as number of retail stores is a large weight of the competitive facilities
index. Table 2 summarizes, their characteristics depending on their situation:
HHI less than 4,000, HHI between 4,000 and 10,000 and PCA in monopoly.
125 PCA contain only one retail store. Degree of competition is various and
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.19
Table 2: Characteristics of selected population catchment areas
Competitive Uncompetitive Monopolistic
# observations 14 161 121
Population 447,801 29,249 8,680
(469,553) (37,809) (3,772)
Surface area 1,142 330 138
(km2) (691) (310) (114)
Density 438 330 138
(inhab./km2) (490) (310) (318)
Immigration rate 0.07 0.06 0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment rate 10.7 10.0 10.1
(1.8) (2.2) (2.5)
# stores 38.9 3.5 1.0
(35.4) (3.0) (0)
HHI 2,393 4,947 10,000
(377) (983) (0)
For each category, the first line is the mean and in brackets are the standard
deviation coefficients.
population and surface area are both variables, which vary with HHI. However,
their correlation with HHI is weak (-0.21 and -0.14 respectively).
Types of job and applicants The target job is cashier in retail stores. The
study of Askenazy et al. (2009) show a large turnover of almost 80% between
2003 and 2005 in the sector and it seems that this particular job is only a spell
before a better one. The main modes of application are network, ad in the
store or spontaneous applications. It does not need particular abilities even if
a vocational education in trade practice is welcome. The training last two days
when the worker has no experience but only half a day if she already worked as
cashier. It is predominantly a women’s job in France. As note Askenazy et al.
(2009), cashiers are not unionized (only 2%), are often part time workers and are
mainly vulnerable individuals. Employers admit that they favor single mothers
because they need to keep their job in spite of low wages and the severity of
working condition. Moreover, they recognize to hire less foreigners and colored
people, supposedly to answer to consumers’ taste.
The third step of this correspondence study is to choose the target popula-
12
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Figure 3: Proportion of immigrants in the total population by employment area
in 2007
Source : INSEE
tion. Since this experiment aims at testing the impact of competition on the
hiring discrimination, the target population has to be discriminated against. In
France, evidence of discrimination against the second generation immigrants is
well-established, notably by the correspondence study of Duguet et al. (2010).
They had shown that French young workers with Moroccan origin are clearly
discriminated against in sectors of accounting and hotel business. A large part of
them have North-African parents and obtained the French nationality at their
legal majority. Their French nationality is not sufficient to obtain the same
chance on the labor market than young French people with native origin and
name. The second generation immigrants is also the first target population of
the experiment. In this case, the referent population to estimate the level of
discrimination is young workers with French origin. Moreover, as cashier is a
13
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women job, both genders are tested in order to detect a self-selection of women
or a discrimination against men in this sector.
Resumes creation The fourth step of the design is to create appropriated
resumes. In order to make credible templates, a human resources manager of
a retail store has given some accepted CVs. The characteristics of applicants
are inspired from these true CVs. To keep a usual framework, biographies are
designed with templates of the word processor. Four different one are used to
be sure that a firm does not received resumes with an identical shape.
The applicants are 20, obtained a vocational high school degree in trade
practice and have some work experience by trainings and student job during
holydays. Student job is cashier in discounted retail establishments in order
to have an experience in the job. Trainings concern other trade sector, like
clothing salesperson or salesperson in a DIY shop. She has basic computer
skills and practices sport. The resumes are adapted to the location and firms
used for training are national firms present in all regions.
Each applicant has an e-mail address, a phone number and a postal address.
Fictious e-mail addresses are created for each applicant, made up of her name
and surname. Applicants in each origin/gender cell have the same phone num-
ber. The phone lines have only a voice mailbox attached to them. A similar
outgoing message is recorded on each of the voice mailbox but each message is
recorded by someone of the appropriate gender and without any accent, which
can indicate a foreign origin. Since the same phone number is allocated for
applicants with different names, the outgoing message contains only the phone
number and no person name. Concerning postal addresses, fictious addresses
are determined in burgs when the employment area is rural and in the center
of the city when the employment area is urban. This strategy allows avoiding
districts with bad connotations.
Origins are suggested by the name and surname of the candidate. The
French nationality is clearly written on resumes and typical Moroccan-sounding
or French-sounding name and surname informs of the origin of the applicant.
Each tested type has four possible names to be sure that one of the chosen
names does not affect the results. In order to select names of candidates, the
14
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Table 3: Names used in experiment by gender and origin
Gender
Women Men
Naïma Jlassi Ahmed Charbit
Moroccan Aïda Djalouzi Mounir Benzekri
Fadela Khalis Mehdi Brahimi
Origin Soraya Haddad Selim Belkacem
Gaëlle Dupuis Pascal Martin
French Justine Bonnet Nicolas Leroux
Claire Dufour Sébastien Rivière
Stéphanie Masson Vincent Dubois
correspondence study of Duguet et al. (2010) is used. They choose usual Mo-
roccan surnames and first names are Moroccan usual names of this generation.
Concerning French-sounding names, first names are the most common in the
eighties and family names are the most current ones in France (Table 3). In
both cases, names unambiguously sound Moroccan or French. Applicants’ gen-
der is clearly indicated on resumes and cover letters by the name of applicants
and adjectives and nouns agreements.
Timeline The experiment was carried out from April to July and from Septem-
ber to November 2011. The one-month break is due to annual closing of ad-
ministrative service in August. An applicant name of each type is associated
with a random chosen type of resume. By origin and gender, a resume with
a motivation letter is sent to each store of the employment area. The send-
ing order is random and two applications are sent with an interval of 15 days.
1250 supermarkets and large stores have been targeted in 54 employment areas,
which is equivalent to 5000 resumes sent.
3 Results
This section summarizes results of the correspondence study. The first para-
graph shows that there is some discrimination in the hiring process. As its
presence is established, the second part studies if results are different depending
15
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on the level of competition. Finally, the last paragraph estimates the likelihood
to be called back and points out the impact of competition. In this article, I
consider that there is discrimination when the rate of positive return for a type
of candidate is higher than another type. A positive return is a call back or an
e-mail asking more information on the candidate or offering an interview. More-
over, the sample is bootstrapped in order to have robust results. The number
of replications is 10,000 in the t tests and in the probit estimations.
Is there a gender/origin gap in callbacks?
First, Table 4 summarizes the callbacks for interview by origin and gender. 391
applicants received a callback from 274 stores. Women have 8.80 percent chance
Table 4: Callbacks by origin and gender
Moroccan French Total
[79] [312] [391]
Women 3.92 13.68 8.80
[220]
Men 2.40 11.28 6.84
[171]
Total 3.16 12.48 7.82
[391]
H0: Men=Women p=0.0098
By origin: Moroccan p=0.0298
French p=0.0695
H0: Moroccan=French p=0.0000
By gender: Women p=0.0000
Men p=0.0000
For each category, the first line is the percentage of callbacks
and in brackets is the number of callbacks. Each applicant
sent 1250 resumes and motivation letters.
of being called back. Equivalent resumes of male applicants have a 6.84 percent
chance of receiving a callback. This represents a difference in callback rate of
1.96 percentages points, which is significant at 99%. Whereas this is a women’s
job in France, it seems to be partly due to a self-selection of women, the other
part coming from discrimination. Indeed, men receive a significant number of
callbacks when they applicate. Breaking results by origin, the difference by
16
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gender is higher and more significant amongst workers with a Moroccan origin
than workers with a French-sounding name.
Concerning origin, resumes with French sounding names have a 12.48 per-
cent chance of having an interview. Equivalent resumes with Moroccan sounding
names only have 3.16 percent chance of having a callback. The probability that
a worker with Moroccan origin receives a callback is almost 4 times less than
the probability for an applicant with a French sounding name. This difference
of 9.32 percentage points is highly significant. Since names are randomly as-
signed during the experimental design, this difference can only be attributed to
the name manipulation. This result is consistent with the findings of Duguet
et al. (2010) that a significant discrimination against workers of Moroccan ori-
gin during the hiring process is observed in France. Dividing the sample by
gender, a larger gap is observed for men than for women. In both cases, the
null hypothesis of an equality of means is rejected.
Table 5: Distribution of callbacks by store and gender
Men Favored: 0Wo+1Me 0Wo+2Me 1Wo+2Me
6.6 6.2 0.2 0.2
[83]
Women Favored: 1Wo+0Me 2Wo+0Me 2Wo+1Me
9.9 8.3 0.9 0.7
[124]
Equal treatment: 1Wo+1Me 2Wo+2Me
5.4 4.8 0.6
[67]
# stores 1250
H0: Men=Women p=0.002
Me stands for Men and Wo for Women. For each category, the
first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in
brackets is the number of store. For instance, 2Wo+1Me means that
both women and one man received a callback.
Rather than studying the number of callbacks by applicant type, one can
use the distribution of callback at the store level. This allows observing a
preference for one type of applicant or another, which better fit discrimination
definition. Tables 5 and 6 reports three different treatments of applicants by
employers. The first two lines count when there is a preference. The type A
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is favored in three cases: when an A applicant and none B applicant receive
a callback, when both A applicants and none B applicant are called back and
when both A applicants and only one B applicant receive a callback. In the
last line, both types of applicants (Moroccan/French origin, men/women) are
equally treated. It occurs when no applicant is called back, or one applicant of
each type receives a callback, or all four applicants are asked for an interview.
Keeping this definition induces that equal treatment is essentially composed
of no callback. In order to better annalyse results, this category is dropped of
tables. As it will be discussed in the Section 4, taking them into account induces
an under-estimation of discrimination. First, Table 5 shows that women and
men are not treated even if a man slightly receives less callbacks in average.
The t test points out that the averages of stores favoring men and women are
significantly different at 99%. In other words, it means that women are preferred
by employers. It reinforces assessments of Askenazy et al. (2009) that employers
want to hire women more than men because of a statistical discrimination:
women are said to better accept bad condition than men, which should decrease
the large turnover. Table 6 shows a preference for French origin applicants.
Table 6: Distribution of callbacks by store and origin
French Favored: 0Mo+1Fr 0Mo+2Fr 1Mo+2Fr
17.2 12.3 4.1 0.8
[215]
Moroccan Favored: 1Mo+0Fr 2Mo+0Fr 2Mo+1Fr
2.5 2.2 0.2 0.1
[31]
Equal treatment: 1Mo+1Fr 2Mo+2Fr
2.2 1.7 0.6
[28]
# stores 1250
H0: Moroccan=French p=0.000
Mo stands for Moroccan and Fr for French. For each category, the
first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title and in
brackets is the number of store. For instance, 2Mo+1Fr means that
both applicants with a Moroccan sounding name and one applicant
with a French sounding name received a callback.
They are favored by 17.2 percentage points of employers whereas only 2.48
percents of employers prefer applicants with a Moroccan sounding name. This
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difference is highly significant and no symmetry is also observed in the favoring
of workers with French sounding name and workers with Moroccan sounding
name. The ratio is yet one fourteenth, which confirms Table 4 figures and the
strong discrimination against second generation immigrants from Morocco.
Does discrimination vary according to competition?
Discrimination against men and especially against applicants with Moroccan
origin is well established by the previous section. This part aims at observing
a statistical difference between population catchment areas (PCA) with various
levels of competition.
First, Table 7 and Table 9 tabulate the average callback rates by gender and
HHI category, and by origin of names and HHI category, respectively. These
tables give an overlook of some variations of discrimination depending on the
level of competition of the PCA. It is worth observing that the percentage
of callbacks for an interview decreases with the level of competition whatever
the gender and the origin of the applicant. This is consistent with the fact
that a more competitive environment induces a tighter labor market. However,
monopolistic areas have the same callback rate than competitive areas. Tables
8 and 10 show the same analysis at store level instead of candidate level.
Table 7: Callbacks by gender and HHI category
Competitive Uncompetitive Monopolistic
Women 9.4 7.2 9.6
Men 7.3 5.6 7.2
# applications 1,542 708 250
Men/women 0.78 0.78 0.75
H0: Men=Women p=0.037 p=0.233 p=0.334
For each category, the first lines are the percentage of callbacks.
As has already been pointed out, men and women are differently treated
in average. A difference in favor of women is observed and is statistically sig-
nificant. Table 7 shows that the variation of the degree of competition has no
impact on the gender gap of interview. The ratio of answers of men and women
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is about 77 in the three cases. Tests of Hotelling show that higher the com-
petition, less an equality of means could be accepted. In other words, lower
is the level of competition, the more a significantly different treatment is ob-
servable between men and women. At first thought, we can assume that men
may be discriminated against in uncompetitive employment areas. A possible
interpretation is that, in a more competitive framework, it is costly for stores
to favor women as cashier. However, these results have to be confirmed ceteris
paribus and not only be observed in descriptive statistics. A comparison by
Table 8: Distribution of callbacks by gender and store
Competitive Uncompetitive Monopolistic
Women Favored 43.6 47.7 50.0
Men Favored 29.6 32.3 30.0
Equal treatment 26.8 20.0 20.0
# answering stores 179 65 30
# stores 771 354 125
H0: Women=Men p=0.012 p=0.159 p=0.222
For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to
the title and in brackets is the number of stores. For instance, 10.30% of
stores located in a competitive employment area favored women, which is
equivalent to 45 stores.
store gives a slightly different analysis. Indeed, if men are favored in the same
proportion whatever the degree of competition, women are less preferred when
competition increases. In the case of a discrimination of employers à la Becker,
competition increases expression of preferences for the population discriminated
against and/or decreases expression of preferences for the population favored,
as discrimination or nepotism are costly. Women should be in the second case.
Table 9 gives the distribution of callbacks by origin and level of competition
of the employment area. The percentage of callbacks is lower for young workers
with Moroccan sounding name and this gap is significant whatever the level
of competition. However, the results do not seem to depend on competition.
The ratio of positive answer to workers of Moroccan origin on workers of French
origin is relatively stable and reaches 0.25 At first sight, the prediction of Becker
is not validated by this experiment. A higher competition level does not decrease
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Table 9: Callbacks by origin and HHI category
Competitive Uncompetitive Monopolistic
Moroccan 3.4 2.5 3.6
French 13.4 10.3 13.2
# applications 1,542 708 250
Moroccan/French 0.25 0.25 0.27
H0: Mo=Fr p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
For each category, the first lines are the percentage of callbacks.
the discrimination against second generation immigrants on the labor market.
Table 10: Distribution of callbacks by origin and store
Competitive Uncompetitive Monopolistic
# stores [771] [354] [125]
French Favored 77.6 80.0 80.0
Moroccan Favored 11.2 7.7 20.0
Equal treatment 11.2 12.3 0
# answering stores 179 65 30
H0: Moroccan=French p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
For each category, the first line is the percentage of stores corresponding to the title
and in brackets is the number of stores. For instance, 21.06% of stores located in a
competitive employment area favored French origin, which is equivalent to 92 stores.
Table 10 studies by HHI category how employers favor some applicants.
Whatever the level of competition, employers favor workers with French sound-
ing names. The difference in callbacks for an interview between both origins
is statistically significant and the null hypothesis of equality of means between
both groups is rejected. However, as in the previous table, there is no strong ev-
idence of an impact of competition in this difference. To confirm this conclusion,
the next section presents an econometric study taking into account observable
characteristics of employment areas.
To summarize, descriptive statistics does not show a disappearance of dis-
crimination with competition. Concerning gender, the gap is only significant
when competition is high. The taste of employers for a discrimination against
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men is rejected. The study of Askenazy et al. (2009) on the French retail sector
explains that employers prefer hiring women suffering fragile economic condition
in order to decrease the turnover of employees. This explanation suggests that
there is a correlation between a competitive market of retail and a tight labor
market. Concerning applicants with Moroccan origin, discrimination seems to
be due to a taste of customers. Indeed, the level of discrimination does not
vary with competition. In the study of Askenazy et al. (2009), employers ad-
mit a discrimination against workers of foreign origin supposedly to answer of
customers’ taste. In this case, a higher competition will not have any impact of
discrimination because the cost is borne by consumers. The next part aims at
controlling other characteristics of areas in order to disentangle the real impact
of competition from other causes of discrimination.
What is the influence of competition on discrimination?
In order to study the impact of competition on the hiring process ceteris paribus,
the probability to have an interview is estimated by a probit model. The ex-
planatory equation of a callback is the following:
Callback∗i = X
′
iδi +X
′
jδj +X
′
EAγEA +X
′
PCAγPCA + νi (1)
where Callback∗ is latent variable, Xi the vector of characteristics of applicant i,
Xj the one of the firm, XEA the one of employment area EA and XPCA the one
of population catchment area PCA, δ and γ the coefficient to be estimated and
ν the error term. The latent variable is not observable and an index-function is
used:
Callbacki = 1 if Callback
∗
i > 0
Callbacki = 0 if Callback
∗
i ≤ 0
where Callbacki = 1 indicates that the applicant received a callback and Callbacki =
0 that she does not. The error term of the equation is normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance σν . As every other characteristics are identical, variables
of Xi are origin and gender. Xj is composed of the number of cash desk and
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the nature of the owner. XEA contains unemployment rate, the density of the
area, region and immigration rate concerning origin. XPCA comprises the rate
of blue and white collar in the population, if there is a central city in the PCA
and the variable of interest, the HHI.
Table 11 reports the impact of control variables on the likelihood to receive
a callback for an interview. Estimation (1) contains only individual character-
istics, competition index and geographical data such as region and rural/urban
location of the PCA. To be a woman increases the probability to be called back
by 5.6%. The likelihood for an applicant with a Moroccan sounding name to
obtain an interview is lower by roughly 30% percentage points than likelihood
of other applicants. These results are consistent with previous observations.
The effect of competition index is significant. In order to allow non-linear ef-
fect, HHI is linear and squared. Moreover, to make reading easier, the index is
divided by hundred. Results show that the more competitive the area, lower is
the probability to obtain an interview. However, the negative impact decreases
with concentration. Intuition suggests that competition is synonymous of a
larger number of stores and also a larger number of jobs and we have to purge
competition of these effects. Furthermore, a monopolistic firm can easier secure
loyalty of employees. Consequently, estimation (2) uses other competition vari-
ables and estimation (3) introduces some characteristics of the labor market in
order to disentangle the role of competition.
The second estimation shows that the size of stores has a positive impact on
the probability to be called back. Retail companies have two different mode of
governance. Half of them manage their stores by franchise or branch stores and
the other half are composed of individual owners, who are signatory of the com-
pany’s charter. In the first case, managers are not owners and, even if they are
profit-sharing, the prediction of Becker concerning taste of employers should be
less observed than in stores, where the manager is the owner. The probability to
receive a call back decrease of 13.25 percentage points when the manager is not
owner of the store. Central recruitment does not impact the probability. The
third estimation takes into account labor market characteristics and economic
situation. Three variables are introduced: unemployment rate and density of
employment area and the composition of the labor force of PCA. The unem-
23
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.19
Table 11: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview.
(1) (2) (3)
Callback Callback Callback
Woman 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Moroccan -0.74*** -0.74*** -0.75***
origin (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
HHI -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
HHI squared 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment -0.074***
rate (by EA) (0.021)
Density 0.07
(inhab./km2, by EA) (0.06)
White and blue collars -0.63
rate (by PCA) (0.49)
# cashdesks 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Franchise/branch -0.31*** -0.32***
(0.09) (0.09)
Central recruitment -0.03 -0.03
(0.10) (0.10)
Ile-de-France - - -
Ile-de-France periphery -0.17 -0.21 0.13
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
North -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
South West 0.13 0.07 0.27**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
South East -0.18* -0.21** 0.11
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
PCA with a city - - -
of more than 30,000 inhab.
PCA without a city 0.23 0.21 0.25
of 30,000 inhab. (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
PCA in the periphery of a city -0.04 -0.08 -0.07
of more than 30,000 inhab. (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Constant -0.35 -0.21 0.16
(0.25) (0.25) (0.38)
Observations 5,000 5,000 5,000
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PCA stands for population catchment area, EA for employment area.
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ployment rate stands for controlling economic circumstances of the employment
area. It impacts negatively the probability to have an interview as cashier. The
interpretation is intuitive: In a high unemployment place, it would be more
difficult to find a job than in another place because of a queue phenomenon.
The density, which has to control for rural location of EA, has a positive but
insignificant effect. The white and blue collars rate in the population aims at
controlling for the local composition of working population. Its effect is nega-
tive: A higher rate suggests more competition between applicants as cashiers.
However, this impact is not significant. In all cases, the impact of the HHI and
the gender and origin gaps do not vary with the introduction of other variables.
Tables 12 and 13 show the results concerning the estimation of the likeli-
hood to be called back, where variables are interacted with gender and origin,
respectively. Concerning gender, the constant term is positive and significant.
A preference for women is clearly observed in this job, as the likelihood to
receive a callback is 47% higher when the applicant is a woman. Moreover,
interacted terms between other variables and women are not significant, except
some regions where the gender preference is lower. In other words, explanatory
variables have no influence on gender gap. However, signs of coefficients give an
intuition of the situation. First, competition seems to reinforce the gender gap,
which contradicts the employer taste theory. In a competitive PCA, women are
more favored than in a less competitive one. Consequently, probit estimation of
the likelihood to be called back points out a discrimination à la Becker against
women. Indeed, these coefficients are significant for women and the negative
effect is stronger for women than for men. Results are probably not significant
for men because of fewer answers. The fact that a weaker competition induces
a lower likelihood for women to be called back compared to men, can be inter-
preted in this way: when employers have a higher rent, they can spend more
time and money to search an applicant corresponding to their taste and hire a
man. Moreover, the population composition has no impact on women whereas
a larger pool of blue and white collars significantly decreases the probability
to obtain an interview for male applicants. These results are in keeping with
statistical discrimination described by Askenazy et al. (2009): employers prefer
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Table 12: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview by gender.
(1)
Callback
Interacted
with woman
Moroccan -0.80*** 0.08
origin (0.09) (0.11)
HHI -0.021 -0.025
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.016) (0.019)
HHI squared 0.0001 0.0002
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment -0.066** -0.018
rate (by EA) (0.027) (0.032)
Density 0.11 -0.06
(inhab./km2, by EA) (0.07) (0.09)
White and blue collars -1.64** 1.3
rate (by PCA) (0.79) (0.87)
# cashdesks 0.007*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Franchise/branch -0.20* -0.24*
(0.11) (0.13)
Central recruitment -0.10 0.14
(0.13) (0.15)
Ile-de-France - -
Ile-de-France periphery 0.43** -0.51**
(0.19) (0.22)
North 0.13 -0.56**
(0.20) (0.22)
South West 0.46*** -0.31*
(0.14) (0.16)
South East 0.17 -0.10
(0.19) (0.21)
PCA with a city - -
of more than 30,000 inhab.
PCA without a city 0.20 0.09
of 30,000 inhab. (0.20) (0.23)
PCA in the periphery of 0.04 -0.21
a city of more than 30,000 inhab. (0.22) (0.24)
Constant -0.35 1.16**
(0.49) (0.58)
Observations 5,000
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PCA stands for population catchment area and EA for employment area.
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women because their turn over is lower and they accept harder tasks and part
time contracts. Coefficients of unemployment rate reinforce this interpretation
as increasing unemployment rate impacts more sharply women than men. In
other words, when the labor market is more tight, employers prefer women than
men, ceteris paribus. To summarize, the lower probability of men to obtain
an interview is less due to a discrimination against them than the results of
women condition on the labor market and beliefs of employers concerning their
vulnerability.
Besides, variables are further interacted with a dummy variable for whether
the applicant has a Moroccan or a French sounding name. Dummies on immi-
gration rate are added in regression in order to control for a negative reaction
to a higher immigration rate. Results are summarized in the Table 13. The
coefficients of interacted terms are only significant concerning immigration and
unemployment rate, way of management and Northern France. As regards im-
migration rate, simple and interacted coefficients cancel each other. It means
that the probability of an applicant with a Moroccan sounding name to obtain
an interview does not vary with the immigration rate. On the contrary, an ap-
plicant with a French sounding name has a better chance to be called back if the
number of immigrants is high in the local labor market. Moreover, the impact
of immigration rate is only significant when more than 9.5% of population is
immigrant. As in the gender case, the tightness of the labor market has not the
same impact for both origins. A significant difference of almost 3 percentage
points is observable in favor of the French origin. In other words, an increase of
unemployment rate has a stronger impact on the Moroccan origin than on the
French one. When the pool of applicants is larger, employers prefer the ethnic
majority. Concerning competition, coefficients are not significant but signs com-
ply with the Becker’s theory of employer taste for discrimination. The impact
of competition is stronger for workers with a Moroccan sounding name. Co-
efficients Franchise/branch reinforce this results. Branch stores and franchises
call back more applicants with a Moroccan sounding name and fewer applicants
with a French sounding name. Result of Central recruitment supports employer
taste, as the coefficient is negative. Employers, who do not recruit by central
office, are those who want to satisfy their taste. However, result is not signif-
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Table 13: Estimation of the probability to obtain an interview by origin.
(1)
Callback
Interacted
with origin
Woman 0.11** 0.11
(0.05) (0.11)
HHI -0.022* -0.027
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.013) (0.030)
HHI squared 0.0002* 0.0002
(*0.01, by PCA) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Immigration rate 0.21 -0.28
0.065<0.095 (by EA) (0.13) (0.18)
Immigration rate 0.41** -0.46**
>0.095 (by EA) (0.18) (0.23)
Unemployment -0.066*** -0.068*
rate (by EA) (0.024) (0.039)
Density 0.092 -0.090
(inhab./km2, by EA) (0.071) (0.113)
White and blue collars -0.55 0.27
rate (by PCA) (0.081) (0.79)
# cashdesks 0.005** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
Franchise/branch -0.44*** 0.37**
(0.22) (0.16)
Central recruitment -0.001 -0.085
(0.116) (0.184)
Ile-de-France - -
Ile-de-France periphery 0.41* -0.20
(0.22) (0.34)
North 0.09 -0.72**
(0.22) (0.32)
South West 0.49*** -0.12
(0.17) (0.36)
South East 0.17 0.07
(0.19) (0.28)
PCA with a city - -
of more than 30,000 inhab.
PCA without a city 0.10 0.43
of 30,000 inhab. (0.15) (0.33)
PCA in the periphery of -0.0004 -0.37
a city of more than 30,000 inhab. (0.18) (0.27)
Constant -0.58 0.83
(0.44) (0.76)
Observations 5,000
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PCA stands for population catchment area and EA for employment area.
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icant. In short, a part of origin gap is due to employers and another could be
due to customers’ taste because of the impact of immigration rate.
Results point out two different conclusions. First, it is worth to identify
the type of discrimination before using competition to decrease discrimination.
In the gender case, competition reinforces bad work condition of women and
induces more segregation than equality. Second, to incite companies to increase
awareness of human resources manager seems to be a better policy to fight
discrimination than to improve competition.
4 Robustness checks
Experimental design The experimental design aims at controlling all appli-
cants’ characteristics. However, some templates for resumes may be better than
others, or a specific name may have more callbacks due to a less typical feeling.
Resumes are sent in a randomize order. However, to be sent first could have a
positive effect on callbacks. In this section, the effect of applicants’ characteris-
tics and resumes is estimated on the likelihood of callback to confirm neutrality
of the design. Table 14 summarizes the results. As none coefficients of ’CV’
is significant, templates of resumes are equivalent, even if CV4 has a negative
coefficient and CV2 and CV3 a positive one. Moreover, order of sending is not
significant even if the first intuition is confirmed as to be sent first or second
has a positive impact on the likelihood to be called back. Finally, names are
relatively equivalent as no coefficient is significant, except the second Moroccan
female name of "Aïda Djalouzi", which has a positive and significant impact
on the likelihood to obtain an interview. Note that nul coefficients come from
gender and origin dummies and those results are similar without any control
variables. According to the results, the experimental design of this correspon-
dence study is relatively neutral.
Answering stores As the main point of this paper is the impact of compe-
tition on discrimination, it could be interesting to restrict the sample to stores,
which answer to, at least, one applicant. Indeed, stores, which did not answer,
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cannot be classified as prejudiced or not. Table 15 summarizes results of the
probit regression of the likelihood to be called back. The few number of ob-
servations decreases the significance of coefficients. First column is the basic
estimation of the probability to be called back. Only gender and origin and
Southwestern France are significant. It is worth to notice that gender coefficient
is lower and the origin one is larger than in previous estimations. It suggests
that discrimination against applicants with a Moroccan sounding name is un-
derestimated and women preference overestimated. The second column contains
results of the probit regression where all variables are interacted with gender.
Men have a higher probability to be favored when competition decreases and
signs of coefficients are similar to previous regressions. The third regression
concerns origin and all variables are interacted with origin. Applicants with a
Moroccan sounding name increase their chance to have an interview when com-
petition goes down. Only two coefficients remain significant: unemployment
rate and the way of management. The first one has a negative effect on the
probability of Moroccan origin applicants to obtain an interview, the second
has a negative impact on the likelihood to obtain an interview for applicants
with a French origin. This results mirror the previous one.
Preferences In order to better explain discrimination as a preference, an or-
dered probit model of the likelihood to favor an origin or a gender is estimated.
Results basically mirror our previous findings (Table 16) but are not significant,
certainly due to a lack of data. Concerning gender, men have a higher prob-
ability to be favored when competition decreases. In the second estimation,
applicants with a Moroccan sounding name increase their chance to have an in-
terview when competition goes down. Only two coefficients remain significant:
unemployement rate and the way of management. The first one has a positive
effect on the probability of French origin applicants to obtain an interview, the
second a negative one. This confirms former findings.
Table 17 sums up the results of a probit regression of the likelihood to pre-
fer one category of applicants. Coefficients are consistent with former results
on the probability to obtain an interview. Concerning gender, coefficients are
not significant except concerning geographical location. However, it confirms
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our previous findings as competition increases the probability of women to ob-
tain an interview whereas it decreases this probability for men. Findings on
origin highlight two points. First, the usual effect of competition on discrimina-
tion suggests a taste of employers for discrimination against second generation
migrants. Coefficients of applicants with Moroccan origin decrease with the
competition level as Becker’s theory predicts. Coefficients of the way of man-
agement reinforce this conclusion. Second, the unemployment rate decreases
the likelihood to obtain an interview for Moroccan origin applicants whereas it
increases the likelihood of French origin applicants. This result reinforces the
results on the tightness of the labor market.
5 Conclusion
This article uses an original way to study the impact of competition on labor
market outcomes. This experiment adds to the literature on the consequences of
a variation of competition. The hiring process has never been studied and this
correspondence study in the French retail sector allows us to measure the effect
of competition on hiring. The population tested is young French applicants with
Moroccan sounding names, male and female. Results show that men do not face
discrimination, contrary to what one may think at first sight. On the contrary,
their callbacks decrease with competition, showing that if employers have a rent,
they prefer hiring men. This shows that experiment studies do not always point
out discrimination. A deeper analysis of descriptive statistics is necessary to
correctly interpret reults. Concerning origin, a large and significant difference
of callbacks for an interview underlines discrimination against the second gen-
eration immigrants from North Africa in France. The level of competition has a
positive impact on the number of callbacks whatever the origin of the applicant.
Nevertheless there is no evidence for a stronger effect concerning the population
discriminated against. Becker’s theory could be applied in this case as employ-
ers seems to have a taste for discrimination. However, higher competition is less
efficient to reduce discrimination than a consciousness rising of human resources
managers to discrimination.
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Figure 4: Density of the HHI by employment area.
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Table 14: Effect of application characteristics on likelihood to receive a callback
Interview
Name Mf 1 Name Mm 1 -0.36 CV 2 0.06
(0.28) (0.07)
Name Mf 2 0.18 Name Mm 2 0.051 CV 3 0.06
(0.14) (0.23) (0.07)
Name Mf 3 0.18 Name Mm 3 0.28 CV 4 -0.15
(0.14) (0.22) (0.12)
Name Mf 4 0.10 Name Mm 4 0 Second 0.05
(0.14) (0) (0.07)
Name Wf 1 0.23 Name Wm 1 0.13 Third -0.02
(0.26) (0.22) (0.07)
Name Wf 2 0.19 Name Wm 2 0.47** Fourth -0.06
(0.27) (0.20) (0.08)
Name Wf 3 0.18 Name Wm 3 0.26 Constant -0.63*
(0.27) (0.21) (0.34)
Name Wf 4 0.17 Name Wm 4 0
(0.28) (0)
Observations 5,000
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Estimation is controlled for gender, origin, competition, regions, unemployment rate
and density of the employment area, the number of cashdesks in the store and its
way of managment, composition of population and type of PCA.
Wf stands for women with a French sounded name, Wm for women with a Moroccan
sounded name, MF stands for men with a French sounded name and Mm for men
with a Moroccan sounded name.
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Table 15: Estimation of the likelihood to obtain an interview, limited sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Callback Callback Callback
Moroccan -1.26*** -1.29*** 0.02
origin (0.10) (0.14) (0.18)
Woman 0.29*** 0.28** 0.04
(0.09) (0.125) (0.182)
HHI -0.014 0.010 -0.046 -0.005 -0.040
(*100, by PCA) (0.013) (0.025) (0.041) (0.016) (0.044)
HHI squared 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.00003 0.0003
(*100, by PCA) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Immigration rate -0.11 -0.24
0.065<0.095 (0.15) (0.29)
Immigration rate 0.04 -0.55
>0.095 (0.19) (0.42)
Unemployment -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.020 -0.121*
rate (by EA) (0.022) (0.043) (0.072) (0.033) (0.071)
Density -0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.14
(inhab./km2, by EA) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.09) (0.18)
White and blue collars 0.007 -1.075 1.815 -0.073 0.107
rate (by PCA) (0.502) (1.166) (1.498) (0.722) (1.913)
# cashdesks 0.0004 0.004 -0.008 -0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Franchise/branch -0.07 0.11 -0.36 -0.25** 0.44
(0.08) (0.16) (0.27) (0.12) (0.27)
Central recruitment -0.03 -0.12 0.17 0.04 -0.12
(0.09) (0.19) (0.32) (0.16) (0.33)
Ile-de-France - - - - -
Ile-de-France periphery 0.09 0.57** -0.88* 0.23 -0.33
(0.15) (0.27) (0.49) (0.31) (0.65)
North -0.01 0.56* -1.07* 0.33 -1.06*
(0.17) (0.33) (0.56) (0.29) (0.58)
South West 0.19* 0.48** -0.55 0.31 -0.19
(0.11) (0.22) (0.34) (0.21) (0.49)
South East -0.03 0.11 -0.25 0.01 0.16
(0.14) (0.32) (0.54) (0.26) (0.61)
PCA >30,000 inhab. - - - - -
PCA without 0.15 0.01 0.26 -0.04 0.60
city> 30,000 inhab. (0.16) (0.31) (0.51) (0.20) (0.48)
PCA periphery 0.01 0.15 -0.29 0.23 -0.77*
city>30,000 inhab. (0.15) (0.33) (0.50) (0.24) (0.40)
Constant 0.51 -0.37 2.01* -0.14 1.35
(0.37) (0.71) (1.18) (0.63) (1.47)
Observations 1,096 1,096 1,096
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
PCA stands for population catchment area and EA for employment area.
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Table 16: Estimation of the likelihood to favor a gender/origin by an ordered
probit.
(1) (2)
Gender preferences Origin preferences
HHI 0.026 0.060
(*100, by PCA) (0.028) (0.038)
HHI squared -0.0002 -0.0004
(*100, by PCA) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Immigration rate 0.15
0.065<0.095 (0.28)
Immigration rate 0.39
>0.095 (0.39)
Unemployment -0.012 0.137**
rate (by EA) (0.049) (0.063)
Density 0.03 -3.44
(inhab./km2, by EA) (1.75) (2.11)
White and blue collars -1.59 0.22
rate (by PCA) (1.36) (1.32)
# cashdesks 0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Franchise/branch 0.28 -0.49**
(0.192) (0.229)
Central recruitment -0.20 0.01
(0.23) (0.26)
Ile-de-France - -
Ile-de-France periphery 0.77** 0.017
(0.35) (0.52)
North 0.91** 4.36
(0.39) (191.7)
South West 0.48* -0.08
(0.25) (0.44)
South East 0.34 -0.63
(0.37) (0.50)
PCA with a city >30,000 inhab. - -
PCA without a city -0.17 -0.66
of 30,000 inhab. (0.33) (0.44)
PCA in the periphery of 0.05 0.95
a city of more than 30,000 inhab. (0.33) (0.58)
Constant 1 0.50 0.17
(0.822) (1.17)
Constant 2 1.16 0.65
(0.82) (1.17)
Observations 274 274
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Concerning gender, the interest variable is null when no preferences are revealed, −1 when
women are favored and 1 when men are favored. Concerning origin, the interest variable is
null when no preferences are revealed, −1 when Moroccan origin is favored and 1 when French
origin is favored. In estimations (2) and (4), the sample only contains stores which call back
at least one applicant. Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment
area.
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Table 17: Estimation of the likelihood to be preferred by gender and origin.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men Fr. origin Mo. origin
favored favored favored favored
HHI -0.009 0.043 0.057 -0.059
(*100, by PCA) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.045)
HHI squared -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0005
(*100, by PCA) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Immigration rate 0.25 0.23
0.065<0.095 (0.29) (0.39)
Immigration rate 0.37 -0.22
>0.095 (0.40) (0.49)
Unemployment 0.012 -0.018 0.150** -0.125
rate (by EA) (0.053) (0.055) (0.066) (0.082)
Density -0.20 -0.37 -4.56** 1.99
(inhab./km2, by EA) (1.89) (2.07) (2.27) (2.617)
White and blue collars 1.69 -1.24 -0.10 -1.18
rate (by PCA) (1.50) (1.59) (1.33) (1.82)
# cashdesks -0.003 0.008 0.0005 0.006
(0.00596) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Franchise/branch -0.21 0.36* -0.56** 0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.28)
Central recruitment 0.13 -0.26 0.10 0.16
(0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.31)
Ile-de-France - - - -
Ile-de-France periphery -0.84** 0.71* -0.07 -0.28
(0.39) (0.40) (0.54) (0.62)
North -0.96** 0.90** 0 0
(0.44) (0.45) (0) (0)
South West -0.56** 0.40 -0.28 -0.43
(0.27) (0.29) (0.46) (0.53)
South East -0.37 0.36 -0.68 0.60
(0.40) (0.42) (0.52) (0.60)
PCA (city >30,000 inhab.) - - - -
PCA without a city 0.09 -0.21 -0.68 0.46
of 30,000 inhab. (0.36) (0.36) (0.45) (0.53)
PCA in the periphery of -0.052 0.07 0.96 0
a city>30,000 inhab. (0.36) (0.39) (0.59) (0)
Constant 0.14 -1.52 -0.32 0.46
(0.89) (0.93) (1.22) (1.42)
Observations 274 274 253 239
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The sample only contains stores which call back at least one applicant. In estimations (1)
and (2), the interest variable is worth 1 if women/men are favored, 0 otherwise. In estimation
(3), the interest variable is worth 1 if there is any favor (women and men) and 0 in case of
equal treatment. Estimations are controlled for regions. EA stands for employment area.
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